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fendant ''with the intent then and there, and by force and 
violence, to have .and accomplish'' the act. The charge is 
substantially in the language of sections 220 and 261, subdi-
vision 3. It conforms to the requirements for a statement in 
ordinary and concise language and was sufficient to enable 
the defendant as a person of common understanding to know 
what was intended. (Pen. Code, § 950, subd. 2.) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, 0. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 28, 
1951. 
[L. A. No. 21601. In Bank. June 15, 1951.] 
'l'HOMAS E. GREEN, Appellant, v. JAMES 0. BHOWN 
et al., Respondents. 
[1] Cotenancy-Joint Tenancy-Survivorship.-A gift to two or 
more persons for their lives is ordinarily construed as creating 
an estate or estates to endure, not only so long as they are 
all alive, but until death of the last survivor. 
[2] Life Estates-Creation.-A gift to a person for the lives of 
himself and another creates an estate in his favor to endure 
until death of the survivor, the donee having an estate for his 
own life on the death of such other person, while if the donee 
is the first to die, the estate then assumes the characteristics 
of an estate pur autre vie. 
[3] Deeds-Reservations~Interpretation.-In view of Civ. Code, 
§ 1069, requiring reservations to be interpreted in favor of the 
grantor, under a deed executed by two grantors, reserving a 
life estate to both of them in all the property, and the right of 
enjoying the same during the term of their lives, the lives of 
[1] See 7 Cal.Jur. 334; 14 Am.Jur. 82. 
[3] See 9 Cal.Jur. 325; 16 Am.Jur. 615. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Cotenancy,§ 8; [2] Life Estates,§ 2; 
[3] Deeds, § 150; [4] Adverse Possession, § 86; [5] Estoppel, 
§ 27(1); [6] Specific Performance, § 64; [7] Frauds, Statute of, 
§ 59(2); [8] Estoppel, § 24(8); [9] Life Estates, § 14; [10] Life 
Estates,§ 7; [11] Equity,§ 20; [12-14] Life Estates,§ 14. 
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both must have expired before any part of the use of the 
property is lost to either. 
[4] Adverse Possession-Payment of Taxes.-Under a conveyance 
reserving to donors of real property a life estate during the 
term of their lives, donees do not obtain title to the property 
as against donors by adverse possession notwithstanding donees 
live on the premises and pay half the taxes, where a surviving 
donor also lives thereon and pays half the taxes, and no other 
elements of adverse possession appear. 
[5] Estoppe~-Equitable Estoppel-Reliance on Representation.-
The court properly determines that a donor of real property is 
estopped to deny that, notwithstanding his life estate in the 
property, the donees have a permanent home in the premises, 
where, during the life of the donor's wife who joined in the 
deed, the parties had lived for many years on the premises on 
an expense sharing basis and in a fiduciary relationship; where 
upon her death, he indicated things would continue as usual, 
and that he would need only one room; and where he acquiesced 
in improvements made by the donees. 
[6] Specific Performance-Part Performance.-The part perform-
ance required as a prerequisite to specific performance is not 
necessarily part of the agreed exchange for defendant's per-
formance but may be merely action in reliance on his promise, 
as in a promise to make a gift of land, which becomes specifi-
cally enforceable as soon as the promisee has so far acted in 
reliance on the promise as to make it very unjust not to compel 
execution of the gift. 
[7] Frauds, Statute of-Estoppel to Assert Statute.-Under a parol 
gift of land on which the ·donee makes improvements, he is 
not required to show ignorance of status of the title as a pre-
requisite to asserting the donor to be estopped to set up the 
statute of frauds or repudiate the gift, since it is assumed 
that, at the time the gift was made, the donor had title and 
the donee knew, but that donee accepted the property as a 
gift and treated it as his own. 
[8] Estoppel- Equitable Estoppel- Injury or Prejudice.- Suffi-
cient detriment to establish an estoppel against a donor of a 
home valued at $25,000 is shown by evidence that donees ex-
pended $4,100 on improvements, about $900 on an indebtedness 
against the property, and more than $400 on taxes. 
[9] Life Estates-Actions-Judgments.-In an action under a deed 
reserving a life estate in a husband and wife in all the prop-
erty, and the right of enjoying the same during the term of 
their lives, it was error for the judgment to declare that, after 
the death of the wife, the deed reserved a life estate for the 
[5] See 10 Cal.Jur. 628; 19 Am.Jur. 743. 
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husband in only an undivided half interest in the premises; 
and in view of the evidence the portion of the judgment stating 
that his interest was limited to his personal use and was 
subordinate to the paramount actual possession of the donees, 
had to be reversed as not being sufficiently intelligible or cer-
tain. 
[10] !d.-Imposing Lien on Life Estate.-The court errs in impos-
ing on a donor's life estate a lien, in favor of donees residing 
on the premises with him, for improvements made and taxes 
paid by them, where donees receive their interest in the prop-
erty only under the theory that after receiving it as a gift they 
suffered detriment in such amounts. 
[11] Equity-Relief-Disposition of Entire Controversy.-The fact 
that equity may decide all the issues between parties does not 
mean that there does not have to be some basis in law or equity 
to decide the issues one way or the other, since the rule is 
merely one of equity jurisdiction defining the scope of relief 
which may be granted. 
[12] Life Estates-Actions-Evidence.-In an action for declara-
tion of rights under a conveyance of real property reserving 
a life estate in husband and wife donors, the court properly 
admits evidence that donees made a declaration of homestead 
on the property shortly after the gift, notwithstanding the 
evidence is not relevant as to title, where the declaration, being 
made at the suggestion of a donor, is relevant as indicating 
that a gift of the right to occupy the premises was intended 
and accepted. 
· [13] Id.-Actions-Evidence.-In construing a conveyance of real 
property reserving a life estate in husband and wife, evidence 
is irrelevant as to the husband's failure, on his wife's death, 
to establish such death pursuant to Prob. Code, §§ 1170-1175. 
[14] Id.-Actions-Evidence.-In an action for declaration of 
rights under a conveyance reserving in a husband and wife 
as donors a life estate in property on which they resided with 
donees, the court properly admits evidence that donees would 
not have made certain improvements after death of the donor 
wife had they known her husband had remarried, where the 
evidence is relevant on the issue whether they relied on his 
assurances that they could occupy the property without inter-
ference from him. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Carl A. Stutsman, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for declaration of rights under a conveyance of real 
property. Judgment for defendants reversed. 
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Jefferson & Jefferson, Bernard S. Jefferson and Martha 
Malone Jefferson for Appellant. 
Oscar S. Elvrum for Respondents. 
CARTER, J.-Plaintiff and his wife, Etta Green, were 
the owners as joint tenants of real property, with a home 
thereon in which they were residing. Living with them were 
defendants, James Brown and his wife, Zephrene, who was 
the daughter of Etta by a former marriage. The Browns were 
paying $25 a month to the Greens. In 1941 the Greens con-
veyed the property to the Browns and the parties continued to 
occupy the home, the Browns agreeing to pay the Greens $20 
a month on an indebtedness against the property and half 
the taxes and utilities. 
The conveyance above mentioned was made by a deed in 
which the Greens granted to the Browns the title to the prop-
erty "subject, however, to the Life Estate hereinafter re-
served . . . '' The reservation clause to which reference is 
made reads: ''RESERVING and ExcEPTING, however, a Life Es-
tate in the Grantors above named in all of the above described 
property, and the right to use, occupy and enjoy the same 
and to receive the rents, issues and profits therefrom during 
the term of their natural lives.'' 
In 1943, Etta Green died. Plaintiff continued to live in 
the house with the Browns. He remarried and difficulties 
arose between him and the Browns; the instant action followed. 
The trial court determined that under the deed the death 
of Etta terminated her life estate in an undivided half inter-
est in the property and plaintiff had an estate for his life in 
an undivided half interest in the property. This is predi-
cated on the proposition that the reservation in the deed was 
of a life estate in an undivided half interest in each of the 
grantors, making the grantors tenants in common of a life 
estate in the property; that if the life estate were in joint 
tenancy then the survivor would have a life estate in the whole 
property. This construction of the deed is predicated on the 
rule that a joint tenancy is created by a transfer to two or 
more persons when expressly declared by the transfer to be 
such. ( Civ. Code, § § 683, 686.) In the light of that rule 
other factors must be considered. [1] The general rule is 
stated as follows : ''A gift to two or more persons for their 
lives is ordinarily construed as creating an estate or estates 
to endure, not so long only as they are all alive, but until 
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the death of the last survivor. [2] And a gift to a person 
for the lives of himself and another clearly creates an estate 
in his favor to endure until the death of the survivor, the 
donee having an estate for his own life upon the death of 
such other person, while if the donee is the :first to die, the 
estate then assumes the characteristics of an estate pur autre 
vie." (Tiffany, Real Property,§ 49.) (See Flagg v. Badger, 
58 Me. 258; Kenney v. Wentworth, 77 Me. 203; Saunders v. 
Saunders, 373 Ill. 302 [26 N.E.2d 126, 129 A.L.R. 306] ; Dow 
v. Doyle, 103 Mass. 489; Douglas v. Parsons, 22 Ohio St. 526; 
Ogle v. Barker, (Ind.App.) 63 N.E.2d 432; Glover v. Stillson, 
56 Conn. 316 [15 A. 752] ; Corbin v. Manley, 291 Ky. 289 [164 
S.W.2d 394].) [3] The words of the reservation are that 
a life estate is saved to both grantors in all of the property 
and the right of enjoying the same (all of it) during the term 
of ''their lives.'' That is, the lives of both of them must have 
expired before any part of the use of the property is lost to 
either of them. Those words are equivalent to the phrases 
''joint tenancy'' or ''to the survivor of them.'' This con-
struction is fortified by the statutory provision that reserva-
tions are "to be interpreted in favor of the grantor." ( Civ. 
Code, § 1069.) There is nothing in Heiden v. Howes, 77 Ohio 
App. 525 [67 N.E.2d 641], or Guyer v. London, 187 Okla. 326 
[102 P.2d 875], relied upon by defendants, contrary to the 
holding of the foregoing authorities. 
[4] Defendants contend that they acquired title to the prop-
erty by adverse possession because they have been in posses-
sion and paid half the taxes. Plaintiff has also been occupying 
the property. There is no :finding on any issue of adverse 
possession. The trial court found: ''That it is true that the 
cross-complainants and defendants, James 0. Brown and 
Zephrene C. Brown, and each of them, have had the continu-
ous actual possession of said Lot one ( 1), commonly known 
as 2202 Juliet Street, ever since December 15, 1941, and 
that they, and each of them, are now in actual possession of 
said real property." But, no other elements of adverse pos-
session appear. The court found that Etta died and "said 
Life Estate of Etta C. P. Green in said (property] ipso facto 
terminated and vested in said remaindermen, James 0. Brown 
and Zephrene C. Brown, as Joint Tenants, on the date of the 
death of said decedent,'' which is simply a conclusion of law 
based upon the court's erroneous interpretation of the deed, 
rather than a :finding of adverse possession. Moreover, it is 
found that after Etta's death plaintiff had, pursuant to the 
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deed, a life estate in an undivided half interest in the prop-
erty. 
[5] In its judgment the court determined that plaintiff's 
life estate in a half interest is further limited in that it is 
''. . . in all respects subordinate to the paramount actual 
possession of said property theretofore delivered to said James 
0. Brown and Zephrene C. Brown, as Joint Tenants, and ex-
clusively limited to said Thomas E. Green's sole occupancy 
and personal use during the period of his natural life, and 
not otherwise.'' 'rhat limitation is apparently predicated on 
its conclusions of law that plaintiff "does not come into Court 
in the above entitled cause with clean hands, and he is equi-
tably estopped from prevailing in this proceeding and he is 
guilty of laches.'' That conclusion is presumably based on 
the findings that a fiduciary relationship existed between Etta 
and plaintiff and defendants; that at the time of the marriage 
of Etta and plaintiff, the latter was in "poor financial circum-
stances" while Etta had a sum of money which was later 
increased; that defendants, with plaintiff's consent, have been 
occupying the property with plaintiff and Etta on a ''share 
and share alike basis'' ; that in 1942, plaintiff and Etta aban-
doned a homestead they had declared on the property and 
defendants made a homestead declaration on the property 
at plaintiff's and Etta's "recommendations and suggestions"; 
that plaintiff's "aforesaid remaining vested life estate is in 
all respects exclusively limited to the sole occupancy and per-
sonal use of said [plaintiff] during the period of his natural 
life, and not otherwise . . . 
''That it is true that thereafter the defendants . . . in the 
utmost good faith, proceeded to improve said premises with 
the consent of the plaintiff ... and on the 21st day of May, 
1945, the parties involved in this action made, executed and 
delivered that certain unrecorded Deed of Trust covering 
said real property from Thomas E. Green, a widower, and 
James 0. Brown and Zephrene C. Brown, husband and wife, 
as Trustor, to Los Angeles Trust and Safe Deposit Company, 
a California corporation, to secure an indebtedness in favor 
of Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles in the sum 
of $2,500.00 and other amounts payable under the terms 
thereof. 
''That it is true that thereafter a demand was made by said 
Bank for an additional sum of $200.00 for Termite Inspection 
and control of said premises, and said loan was later cancelled. 
''. . . that the defendants . . . discussed the contemplated 
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loans with the plaintiff . . . and he recommended that they 
secure a loan for the improvement of said property from 
another source so that the defendants . . . could fully enjoy 
their lifetime home in said premises; . . . that the defend-
ants ... obtained $1600.00 from an endowment Life Insur-
ance Policy and borrowed $500.00 from the Postal Credit 
Union of Los Angeles, without using the plaintiff's ... 
credit or encumbering said premises; that ... defendants, 
. . . relying upon the statements of plaintiff, . . . that they 
were in possession of their permanent home, thereafter ex-
pended, in the utmost good faith, said sum of $2100.00, and 
other additional amounts, in repairing, remodeling and im-
proving said premises . . . '' 
Plaintiff asserts that the evidence does not support those 
findings. From defendants' evidence it appears that they 
have been living with the Greens, plaintiff and Etta, since 
the 1920's. When the home, a nine-room house, the property 
here involved, was acquired in 1927, they continued to live 
together under a "share and share alike" basis, as the de-
fendants describe it, whereby the living expenses and expenses 
of the property were shared by both families. Prior to the 
execution of the deed in 1941, which conveyed the property 
from the Greens to the Browns, the latter had been paying 
the Greens $25 per month, and thereafter they paid less, but 
they also paid the balance of an indebtedness against the 
property. In 1941, when the deed was made, and thereafter, 
defendants were assured by Etta and plaintiff that they would 
have a permanent home on the property and they would 
''share and share alike.'' Defendants have paid, as found by 
the court, half of the city and county taxes on the property 
ranging from $138 to $152 each year from 1942 to 1948. 
Shortly after its execution, the Greens abandoned a homestead 
they had declared on the property, and at their suggestion, 
defendants declared a homestead on it. After Etta's death 
in 1943, plaintiff told defendants that things would continue 
as usual, "share and share alike" and that they had a perma-
nent home on the property. He ate his meals with them and 
the taxes were borne equally. Early in 1945, they consulted 
with him with reference to improvements on the property 
consisting of redecorating and new furniture. He agreed that 
they should go ahead and do as they wished. . Money was 
borrowed and the improvements were made, consisting of 
painting the outside of the house, redecorating some of the 
interior, and purchasing new furniture. The old furniture 
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was sold with plaintiff's consent and he received the proceeds 
of the sale. The improvements cost about $4,000. At the time 
the improvements were made plaintiff said he would need only 
one room in the house. He repeatedly stated after Etta's 
death that if he remarried, he would not bring his new wife 
into the house to live. He remarried in April, 1945, but did 
not reveal his marriage until the following September, after 
the improvements were made, at which time he stated that he 
wanted to move his wife into the house. Defendant, Mrs. 
Brown, testified, over plaintiff's objection on the ground of 
irrelevancy, that they would not have made the improvements 
if they knew he was going to remarry. 
This evidence seems sufficient to support the findings. Al-
though it may be, to some extent, consistent with the life 
estate reserved in the deed, and thus not a basis for a restricted 
occupancy by plaintiff, yet it is also susceptible of the infer-
ence, that even during the plaintiff's life, as well as after 
his death, defendants were to have the use and occupancy 
of the property as a home. The long course of conduct and 
assurances by plaintiff and Etta could lead defendants to 
believe that they had a permanent home and plaintiff would 
not interfere with their occupancy of it as shown by the 
pattern which had long been followed. There is no direct 
evidence, as stated by plaintiff, that defendants relied upon 
plaintiff's assurances and conduct in making the improvements 
and other expenditures, but we believe it may be inferred. 
It appears from the evidence that most of the assurances 
were made several years before the improvements were made, 
but in view of the fiduciary relationship between the parties, 
the absence of any withdrawal or repudiation of the arrange-
ment, and plaintiff's acquiescence in the improvements, we 
cannot say that the trial court was unjustified in its conclusion. 
Plaintiff asserts that the following elements of an estoppel 
are not present here: (1) No showing that plaintiff had any 
reason to believe defendants were making the improvements 
in reliance on his assurances; ( 2) Defendants were as fully 
aware as plaintiff, or should have been, of the true status 
of the title (a life estate in Etta and plaintiff) ; ( 3) There 
is no showing of a detriment suffered by defendants in that 
the improvements were beneficial to defendants' remainder 
interest and were of slight cost in comparison with the market 
value of the property as well as its rental value, and were 
temporary in character. 
From the evidence presented, a legal theory upon which 
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a judgment may be based "is, that the Greens made an oral 
gift to defendants of a right to occupy the property with 
plaintiff; and that defendants accepted said gift by remain-
ing in possession of the property and making expenditures 
for improvements thereon. An estoppel would then arise 
against plaintiff to rely upon the statute of frauds or re-
pudiate the gift. [6] The rule is stated as follows: "It has 
been previously explained that the part performance required 
by the courts as a prerequisite of specific enforcement is not 
necessarily any part of the agreed exchange for the defendant's 
performance that is compelled. It may be merely action in 
reliance on the defendant's promise. That is particularly 
evident in the case of a promise to make a gift of land; there 
is no agreed exchange of any kind, otherwise the transaction 
would not be a gift. These promises become specifically en-
forceable as soon as the promisee has so far acted in reliance 
on the promise as to make it very unjust (perha"ps again 
called a 'virtual fraud') not to compel execution of the gift.'' 
(Corbin on Contracts, § 441.) (See Peixouto v. Peixouto, 40 
CaLApp. 782 [181 P. 830] ; Howard v. Stephens, 38 Cal.App. 
296 [176 P. 65]; Kinsell v. Thomas, 18 Cal.App. 683 [124 
P. 220] ; Rest., Couts., § 197; Kennedy v. Scally, 62 Cal.App. 
367 [217 P. 96]; Burris v. Landers, 114 Cal. 310 [46 P. 162]; 
Manly v. Howlett, 55 Cal. 94; Anson v. Townsend, 73 Cal. 415, 
417 [15 P. 49]; Husheon v. Kelley, 162 Cal. 656 [124 P. 231]; 
Alpha Stores, Ltd. v. Croft, 60 Cal.App.2d 349 [140 P.2d 688] ; 
Bekins v. Smith, 37 Cal.App. 222 [174 P. 96] .) 
Plaintiff urges, however, that there was no showing that h11, 
had reason to believe defendants relied upon the Greens' 
assurances and gift. He cites Bt"ddle Boggs v. Merced Mining 
Co., 14 Cal. 279 and Lindley v. Blumberg, 7 Cal.App. 140 
[93 P. 894]. Those cases involved silence on the part of the 
owner of property, while another claims ownership and changes 
his position. There is no element of gift in those cases. 
[7] Next, plaintiff relies upon similar cases (Matt v. Nardo, 
73 Cal.App.2d 159 [166 P.2d 37], Killian v. Conselho Supremo 
etc. Portugneza, 31 Cal.App.2d 497 [88 P.2d 214], and Raynor 
v. Drew, 72 Cal. 307 [13 P. 866], for the proposition that in 
order to rely on that kind of estoppel the one urging it must 
be ignorant of the true state of the title. Where, however, 
there is a parol gift, that principle has no application, for it 
is assumed that at the time the gift was made, the donor had 
title and the donee knew, yet the latter accepted it as a gift 
and treated it as his property. 
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[8] A more serious objection to defendants' position is 
that they have not suffered sufficient detriment to establish an 
estoppel-that the outlay by them was trifling and not lasting, 
or to phrase it in the language of part performance, there 
has not been enough. The reasonable rental value of the 
property was $100 per month, and its market value was 
$25,000 at the time the witnesses were questioned. The court 
found that defendants expended $2,100 and ''other additional 
amounts" in improving the property. There is evidence that 
they expended $4,100. In addition, the court found that they 
paid half the taxes on the property for the years 1942 to 
1948, and the total taxes for some years were as follows : 
1946-$152.39; 1947-$138.01; 1948-$142.40. And, also, it 
is found that they paid an indebtedness against the property 
amounting to $886.42. The improvements consisted of painting 
the exterior of the house, redecorating a portion of the in-
terior, laying carpets, replacing furniture and the removal 
of some inside fixtures. The rule is stated in Burris v. Landers, 
supra, 114 Cal. 310, 315 that: " ... the expenditures ... 
must be in the nature of lasting benefits and improvements to 
the land, tending to enhance its value over and above the 
value of the use of the property to the plaintiff. . . . Slight 
and temporary improvements, or trivial outlays, made to suit 
the taste or convenience of the occupant, do not raise an equity 
in favor of the donee ... for, if the value of the expenditures 
made by the occupant does not exceed the benefit to him of 
the use of the land without charge or rental, then, generally, 
and in the absence of other circumstances of hardship shown, 
~he not only will not have been injured, but will in fact have 
been advantaged by the promises made." (See, also, Jonas 
v. Leland, 77 Cal.App.2d 770 [176 P.2d 764] .) We believe 
that under all the circumstances here presented, including the 
fiduciary relationship between the parties, the rule has been 
satisfied. 
[9] Plaintiff urges that the judgment restricting his use 
of the property is erroneous. We hold that the judgment is 
erroneous in declaring that the deed reserved a life estate 
for plaintiff in only an undivided half interest in the premises. 
It further contains the clause heretofore quoted, that plain-
tiff's interest is "subordinate" to the "paramount actual 
possession'' of defendants and is limited to his personal use. 
Precisely what is meant by such an adjudication is difficult 
to ascertain. There is no evidence that defendants' right of 
occupancy was to be superior to that of plaintiff, or that the 
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latter's right was limited to his personal use, except casual 
remarks made by plaintiff that he would only need a room or 
two for himself and that he would not bring a second wife 
into the house. In that state of the record we do not believe 
that that portion of the judgment is sufficiently intelligible or 
certain. As we have seen, the evidence shows that both plaintiff 
and Etta, and later plaintiff, as well as defendants, were to 
remain on as usual as occupants of the property. One concrete 
way of expressing it might be that defendants own an undi-
vided half interest in the property for plaintiff's life and the 
whole thereafter, and plaintiff owns an undivided half interest 
for his life, all by reason of a parol gift by plaintiff and Etta 
of a half of their life estate, but it has not been stated with 
certainty in the judgment, therefore, it must be reversed. 
[10] Plaintiff claims that the court erred in imposing liens 
in favor of defendants on plaintiff's life estate. The court 
impressed a lien in favor of defendants for $2,100, for the 
improvements and for the half of the taxes paid by defendants. 
It is difficult to find any basis for that adjudication. If the 
basic theory is a parol gift followed by a detriment in re-
liance thereon, it would seem the detriment suffered should 
not be charged against the plaintiff-donor as a debt. Defend-
ants-donees have received the property. [11] Defendants cite 
no authority to support that part of the judgment, except 
cases holding that in equity the court may decide all the 
issues between the parties. That may well be true, but it does 
not mean that there does not have to be some basis in law or 
equity to decide such issues one way or the other. It is merely 
a rule of equity jurisdiction and the scope of the relief that 
may be granted. 
[12] Finally, plaintiff complains of rulings on the admis-
sion of evidence. There was admitted the declaration of a 
homestead on the property by defendants shortly after the 
execution of the deed. It is true that such declaration, in itself, 
was not relevant, for it would not affect title, but as it was 
made with the consent and at the suggestion of Etta, it had 
some relevancy as indicating that a gift of the right to occupy 
the property was intended by the Greens and accepted by 
defendants. 
[13] Evidence was admitted that no proceedings had been 
had by plaintiff to establish Etta's death pursuant to sections 
1170-1175 of the Probate Code. We agree that it was irrelevant. 
[14] The testimony by Mrs. Brown that she would not have 
made the improvements on the property if she had known 
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plaintiff had remarried was admissible. It had some relevancy 
on the subject of reliance by defendants, that is, that they re-
lied upon the assurances that they could occupy the property 
without undue interference by plaintiff. 
Judgment reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
Edmonds, J., concurred m the judgment. 
[L. A. Nos. 21768, 21861. In Bank. June 19, 1951.] 
Estate of LOUISE E. DABNEY, Deceased, CLIFFORD R. 
DABNEY et al., Petitioners, v. MILTON H. PHILLEO, 
as Executor, etc., et al., Respondents. 
[1] Decedents' Estates-Distribution-AppeaL-On petitions for 
writ of supersedeas to stay further proceedings in an estate 
pending appeals from orders of ratable distribution, respond-
ents cannot successfully urge that petitioners are not persons 
interested in such estate where it appears from portions of 
respondents' answers, from the records on the appeals, and 
from statements of counsel in the oral argument before the 
Supreme Court, that the existence of such interest is one of 
the points directly concerned in the pending appeals. 
[2] Appeal-Supersedeas-Purpose.-The correctness of the deci-
sion of the trial court is not involved in a supersedeas pro-
ceeding, its purpose being merely to suspend the enforcement 
of the judgment pending appeal. 
[3] !d.-Supersedeas-Particular Judgments Stayed by Perfecting 
AppeaL-Under the provisions of Code Civ. Proc., § 949, the 
perfecting of an appeal from a decree of distribution by an 
appellant who is not required to perform the directions of the 
judgment or order appealed from stays proceedings in the 
court below on the judgment appealed from. 
[4] !d.-Supersedeas-Necessity of Security.-Where an order 
appealed from requires no acts to be performed by appellants 
[2] See 2 Cal.Jur. 422; 3 Am.Jur. 195. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates,§ 1066; [2] Appeal 
and Error, § 390 ; [ 3] Appeal and Error, § 400 ; [ 4] Appeal and 
Error, § 394; [5, 7] Appeal and Error, § 406; [6] Appeal and 
Error, §440; [8,9] Appeal and Error, §407; [10] Appeal and 
Error,§ 431. 
